ABSTRACT With the rapid growth of fifth-generation mobile networks and vehicle to everything communication technologies on Internet of vehicles, vehicular social networks (VSNs) present new research fields for content sharing, data dissemination, and delivery services. Data owners outsource valuable information in the public cloud and share with others. But for security consideration, the owners tend to encrypt the outsourced data and unwilling to share the decryption key. Thus, there is a dilemma: owners will risk privacy leakage by handing over the key while hiding the decryption key, and other users cannot share the data. In this paper, we propose and analyze a selective sharing scheme (S2PD) for vehicular data owners to share their sensitive data with some authorized data users in VSN. S2PD ensures different users acquiring different data with different privilege received from the data owners. In the scheme, the owners upload the privacy data encrypted by key pairs and let the cloud decode the encrypted data to half-decrypted when they need to share the data with some users; the authorized users download the half-decrypted data and decrypt it with a secret key sent by the sharing owners in a secure manner. Then, it protects the data leakage from the curious cloud server and other unauthorized data users. With the increasing data and sharing requests in VSN, compared with other five sharing scheme, experiments proved our scheme is practically efficient.
I. INTRODUCTION
vSNs, composed by Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks and Mobile Social Networks, have grown to be a significant part of the mobile communication system. Different from other sociallyaware networks, data for VSN are from heterogeneous sources, including On-Board Units (OBUs), Infrastructure, drivers, passengers, pedestrians and smart mobile devices [1] . Thus, more and more data generated from VSN are become to be a typical big data and supposed to be outsourced in public cloud [2] . Meanwhile, 5G mobile communication technology enables the interaction between vehicles and cloud to be more convenient. The cloud's data storage capability and computing ability greatly improve the big data usage in VSNs. Thus, many entities will consider sharing the big data by using the interaction with the cloud. But few studies pay attention to research on how to share a privacy data in a secure manner for VSNs' application.
In the VSN scenes, as shown in Figure 1 , vehicle data owners (referred to in this paper simply as VDOs) produce a large number of personal-oriented and public-oriented data [3] . Generally, data generated in VSN can be categorized into three main categories:(a)traffic information (congestion, road maintenance, etc.), (b)personal information (locations, videos,driven distance, pictures, etc.) (c)vehicle information (warnings,Maintenance record, sensor function, etc.). these data can be disseminated and shared between some vehicle users of different groups and usages in VSNs [4] . But OBU is an embedded mobile device with limited storage and computing capacity, VDO often outsources their data to the cloud service provider (CSP)to achieve more storage space [5] - [7] . There arose a new problem for the VDO: how to share different data with different groups of individuals? Such as VDO shares personal photos with family members, meanwhile, assign privilege for local traffic department to gain access to traffic information.
To illustrate, we will consider the following VSN application scenario, vehicle A produces and outsources sensitive data every day, especially in auxiliary driving and interaction of Vehicle to X (V2X), where X can be Vehicle, Pedestrian, Infrastructure, and the Internet. As the owner of the privacy [15] - [17] data, A would not like to store their data in the public cloud without any measures. A curious cloud server may peek at the VDO's privacy data, it could analyze and utilize their data for some purpose [8] , [9] . A common practice is that VDO encrypts the private data before upload to the cloud server. But the encryption will greatly change the data sharing process [10] - [14] . In the mentioned scenario, A has two naive approaches to settle the problem. 1) Vehicle A received the sharing request from vehicle B, so vehicle A negotiates with B to set a session key. Then, vehicle A downloads the data from the CSP and decrypts it. With the session key negotiated before, A encrypts the data again and sends the data to B under the session key. After receiving the encrypted data, vehicle B encrypts data with the session key. We can include that during the sharing procedure, vehicles have to encrypt and decrypt the data twice, not to mention a large number of data transmissions. Obviously, with the increasing amount of sharing data and vehicle users, vehicles with OBU cannot handle the data's calculation and processing.
2) The alternative method is that vehicle A sends the key for decryption to vehicle B directly, and with the decryption key, vehicle B can download the encrypted data from the cloud directly and then decrypts the data by using the shared key. Unfortunately, the private key is associated with A's identity and the data owner A will not share it for security consideration. Therefore, the aforementioned two methods cannot satisfy the user's requirement.
Secure Data-sharing Scheme(SDS2) [34] presented a half decryption scheme for crowd owners to share private data with authorized users securely in a public crowd. In Zhou's scheme [34] , the CSP is not only responsible for storing data, but also be utilized to complete some cryptography computing. If we use Zhou's scheme [34] in the mentioned scenario, A can share the data with different users and wouldn't give their private decryption key to others. It is a secure sharing scheme and reduces overhead local computing operation. But SDS2 let B download all data of one category of A from the CSP. It is not practical for our VSN application because vehicle A produces and outsources sensitive data continually, and he only needs to share some parts of the data to B. For example, in Figure 1 , vehicle B would like to download A's video surveillance data between 9:00 AM to 12:00 AM of a day. It will be not necessary to download all the surveillance data of A which may lead to huge workloads. How to make vehicle B distinguish the data beforehand to download? In our scheme S2PD, the vehicle A and B can search on the shared data, they can only deal with useful data according to their demands. In a technical expression, S2PD focus on looking for a secure searchable scheme under VSNs' scenario, and try to employ CSP as much as possible to handle encrypt computing and communication task. In addition, authorized vehicle users can search on the shared data, and reduce transmission cost by obtaining more accurate data and more concise protocol. Here the distinctive contributions of S2PD are summarized as follows.
1) A secure sharing scheme is proposed for privacy data in VSN, which enables specific data sharing with particular users, can be proven not to disclose any information to the semi-trusted CSP or other adversaries.
2) VSN users can search on the cloud to get more accurate information. It avoids the big overheads brought by downloading all the data, and greatly reduces the data communication cost and provides better VSN user experience.
3)More than half the amount of the communication and computing cost is shifted from VDO to CSP, which greatly improved the data sharing efficiency. VDO with limited computing capacity is only responsible for half-decryption, uploading and transferring certification information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses some related works. Section III illustrates the existing encryption scheme. In Section IV, we give our system model and some assumptions. Section V describes in details of the S2PD Protocol. Section VI analyze the security and performance of our scheme.Experiment results are presented in Section VII. Finally, Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Vehicular Social Network(VSN) has three main components, participants, mobile devices and network infrastructure. VSN always associated with social, security and applications [35] . With the communication technology and social private information of vehicles, it will improve the collaborative content dissemination in the Intelligent Transport System(ITS). With the help of VSN, vehicles will provide corresponding data and share real-time information with each other. Even better, vehicles in VSN will build up a lift cycle of the relationship like in social network. In the VSN, it is the common sense that VDO can't encrypt all data with one session key, cause once the session key gives away, all the privacy data will in danger. There are lots of approaching solutions, with the rapid increasing amount of data and vehicle users in VSN, the problem has attracted lots of research [18] - [27] .
Secure Data-sharing Scheme(SDS2) is a half decryption scheme for crowd owners to share private data with authorized users securely in a public crowd. SDS2 is suitable for those who wouldn't give their private decryption key to others. The users send a sharing request to the cloud, 55140 VOLUME 6, 2018 CSP executes the user's request on half-decrypted data and returns the results to the user for further decryption. With the increasing data and sharing request, SDS2 will be found not practical. The reason is that for every data-sharing progress, the user has to download all the data from the cloud the DO assigned for it. In S2PD we proposed in this paper, there are two major distinctive features from SDS2.
(1) We designed S2PD especially for VSN, in which the vehicle users are generally accepted as possessing limited storage capacity, lower computing ability and experience communication cost. (2)VSN users can search on the cloud to get more accurate information avoiding the overhead brought about by downloading all the data shared with them, which greatly reduce the data communication cost and get better VSN user experience.
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) [18] , [19] is a type of public-key encryption in which the secret key of a user and the ciphertext are dependent on user' attributes. There are mainly two types of attribute-based encryption schemes: Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE) [20] and CiphertextPolicy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) [21] , [22] . An identity-based encryption scheme is specified by four randomized algorithms: Setup, Extract, Encrypt, Decrypt. Setup: It takes a security parameter K and outputs system public key pk and system master key mk. mk will be publicly known, while pk will be known only to the Private Key Generator (PKG).Extract: The extract algorithm extracts a private key from the given pk.Encrypt: it takes plaintext M as input and encrypts under pk based on a series of attributes S. Decrypt: cybertext C S can be decrypted under sk and it returns to plaintext M . In ABE scheme, VDO will generate different keys for different commuters, and VDO should keep online in VSN. Therefore, the computing and communication cost will be huge.
Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE) [23] , [24] , which allow third parties (proxies) to alter a ciphertext which has been encrypted for one party, is generally used for privacy data sharing in the cloud. In PRE, one party, for example, Alice wants to allow Bob to access to her messages encrypted under her public key, but Alice is unwilling to give her private key to Bob. With the help of proxy, the CSP can re-encrypt her message under her public key pk A . Before that, Alice provides a re-encryption key rk A→B associated with Bob to the CSP. Bob will decrypts the message from Alice with his secret key sk B .This method suits applications such as e-mail forwarding and content sharing. Based on the PRE scheme, this paper [24] proposed a Time-Based Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme. However, a weakness of PRE is that the proxy possesses both parties' keys simultaneously. We consider the CSP as a semi-trusted party, our goal is to avoid revealing VDO's identity or user's key, so the PRE scheme is not ideal.
Searchable Encryption [25] , [26] is also widely used in a cloud environment. It provides a positive way to protect users sensitive data while preserving searchability on the cloud server.SE aims to provide a trade-off between protecting data and search encrypted data without leaking information in plaintext data. CryptDB [28] is a well-known system allows CSP queries on encrypted data. In the scheme, various kinds of encryption functions can be deployed in an onion approach. The CSP will implement some specific computations by different degrees of decryption. MONOMI [29] employs a split client/server execution to reduce the workload of the VDO which is base on CryptDB. Wong et al. [30] proposed a searchable encryption with data interoperability in a cloud environment (SDB). In SDB, data owners generate item keys using column keys and upload encrypted data which is encrypted under item keys to the cloud service provider. The scheme allows owners to send the query to the service provider. The semi-trusted service provider returns query results according to the protocols. After receiving results, VDO decrypts returned data to obtain the plaintext. It is worth mentioning that SDB provides various operators, including multiplication, addition,and subtraction for the purpose of data interoperability. Another advantage of SDB is that the CSP undertakes a part of computing work on behalf of the VDO, reducing the computation cost of the VDO significantly. Moreover, the VDO only need to maintain column keys, so the storage of owners is inexpensive. Nevertheless, SDB scheme focuses on the query over encrypted data instead of data sharing issues in cloud storage.
III. PRELIMINARIES
Here we illustrate the existing encryption scheme, SDB Scheme [30] , which we will used as our encryption method in our scheme. SDB Scheme contains the following five algorithms:
Initialization: The initialization algorithm generates two big random prime numbers ρ 1 and ρ 2 according to the RSA method [31] . And it has n = ρ 1 × ρ 2 . The number g is a positive number that is co-prime with n. The data owner maintains the two secret numbers, n and g. Define, φ(n) = (ρ 1 − 1)(ρ 2 − 1). The algorithm generates a column key, CK A , CK B , · · · , CK N for each column A, B, · · · , N . Each column key contains two sub-keys, k 1 and k 2 . We require k 1 , k 2 < n. Consider a column of N rows. It assigns a distinct random row id r 1 , r 2 , · · · , r N for each row.
Item Key Generation: The item key generation algorithm takes row id r and column key CK =< k 1 , k 2 > as input. The item key is given by
Encryption: The encryption algorithm takes as input the plaintext M and the corresponding item key. The ciphertext
Searchable Encryption with Data Interoperability: For simplicity, in the following discussion, we only consider the multiplication operator and the implementation of other operators such as addition, subtraction and comparison are omitted. Consider two columns A and B of a table whose column keys are
FIGURE 2. System model of S2PD.
And a set of item keys of column D follow that,
2 )modφ(n) modn. After receiving the query request from the user, the cloud service provider calculates the corresponding ciphertext of column
Decryption: The decryption algorithm takes the item key k item and the ciphertext C as input. Then the corresponding plaintext M is given by M = k item modn.
IV. SYSTEM MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
A. SYSTEM MODEL Our scheme addresses secure data sharing in VSN. In Intelligent Transport System, we consider the vehicle users generate large amounts of information while possessing limited storage. To pursuit more storage, they outsourced information to public clouds, even including some sensitive data. As shown in Figure 2 , there are four important entities in our scheme:
1) Vehicle Data Owner (VDO):
A vehicle data owner would like to outsource sensitive data together with some keywords to a public cloud. A vehicle data owner defines the sharing policy and sends it to a trusted third party(TA). The third party will make sure the policy to be properly executed.
2) Cloud Service Provider (CSP):
A cloud service provider is the one who provides cloud service and performs search task. Cause CSP hosts mass storage and high computing power, it undertakes tasks including executing sharing requests from VDO and sending the certification to a trusted authority in order to verify the authority. 3) Sharing Vehicle Users (User): A vehicle user wants to search the documents that VDO stored in the CSP. After authority verified, it can download shared data from the CSP and decrypt it with a decryption key received from the vehicle data owners. 4) Trusted Authority (TA): In our scheme, the trusted authority distributes public keys and secret keys for all parties which participate in VSN. We assume the trusted authority can't be compromised at any time.
It executes the policy on behalf of vehicle data owners. 
B. ASSUMPTIONS
We aim at secure sharing.VDO shares its data with the User according to the sharing policy. For our scheme described simplicity, the three assumptions are explained as follows:
• The VDO and User are trusted with each other.
• We consider the CSP to be semi-honest (i.e., honestbut-curious), which means it will follow our protocols but may analyze the secret data and obtain some useful information.
• All the transmission and propagation paths between vehicles are safe but not secure, the assumptions satisfy Delvo-yao's secure model [32] .
V. SELECTIVE SHARING SCHEME (S2PD)
In the following section, details of the S2PD protocol (shown in Figure 2 ) are described. Table 1 contains the notations we frequently used in this paper. In Section V-A, we illustrate the process and the structure of S2PD. The implementation of S2PD is in Section V-B.
A. STRUCTURE OF PROTOCOL
In our scheme, the VDO shares sensitive data outsourced in the cloud with authorized vehicle users. The User can search on the shared data by sending the query to the CSP. A trusted authority is the one who executes the sharing policy on behalf of the VDO. For simplicity, in the following discussion, we only consider the multiplication operator in the query of the User and the implementation of other operators such as addition, subtraction and comparison are omitted.
In the section, we'll explain the details of S2PD between entities shown in Figure 2 .
1) Tasks of the VDO:
During initialization process between VDO and CSP,VDO encrypts data block Data x under the encryption key key x , meanwhile generates an index Index_Data x . The encryption key key x is generated by the VDO and composed of half-decryption key_CSP and half-decryption key_User :
In our scheme, key CSP x is an encryption key of AES [33] . 
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4) Tasks of the TA:
The TA verifies Certy(Data x ) and Certy(Data y ) generated by the User. Once verification passes, the TA sends key CSP x and key CSP y to the CSP for half-decryption ( 5 ).
B. IMPLEMENTATION OF PROTOCOL
We will illustrate the communication messages between the four entities respectively (shown in Figure 3 ). The details are as follows:
Step 1 : we take Data x for example (the message of Data y is similar to Data x ), the message sent by VDO to the TA will be:
where Certy = Certy(Data x ) and Index = Index_Data x . Msg 1 is encrypted under the TA's public key pk TA to ensure that it only can be decrypted by the TA. Binding Certy(Data x ) with timestamp T can prevent replay attacks and tampering operations effectively . TA will create an index table TIndex with the index Index_Data x .
Step 2 : The message Data x sent from the VDO to the User is, Msg 2 = En(pk User , key User x ||En(sk VDO , Certy)||T ), (7) where Certy = Certy(Data x ). Msg 2 should be decrypted by the authorized User who has the decryption key,cause it is encrypt under the User' public key. Msg 2 is encrypted with a timestamp T ,the timestamp is bound with En(sk VDO , Certy(Data x )) to prevent replay attacks. The VDO signs the(Data x ) to be certificate Certy(Data x ) under its secret key to protect data from forgery and tampering.
Step 3 : The message Msg 3 sent by the User, is a request for data sharing. The content is,
Step 4 : In the message Request contains the information of the User's searching query, such as Data * = Data x ×Data y and Certy = (Certy(Data x ), Certy(Data y )). The User encrypts Msg 4 with a timestamp T under the CSP's public key, after receiving the message, the CSP will decrypted it. Timestamp T is an effective way to protect the CSP free from tampering and replay attacks. In our scheme, we bind Request and certificate Certy(Data x ) with the time to protect sensitive data.
Step 5 VDO , Certy(Data y ))can free from various attacks like tampering and replay.
Step 6 : After receiving a request to authenticate Certy(Data x ) and Certy(Data y ), the TA performs verification. If verification is valid, then the TA sends a message to the CSP with the result. The message is,
where Index = (Index_Data x , Index_Data y ).
With the certificate Certy(Data x ) and Certy(Data y ), the TA consults the index table TIndex to obtain the corresponding index of Data x and Data y . The User sends sharing request which contains the message of data query request Data * = Data x × Data y to the CSP, after the query operation, the CSP locates sharing data. To protect the message Msg 5 , the TA encrypts the message with a timestamp T . With the encryption, no one could reveal the message.
Step 7 : The CSP sends the half-encrypted data sharing by VDO to the User,
With key User * received in Step 2 , the User will recover Data * which is the result of Data x × Data y according to the protocol S2PD. Like the above operation, Msg 6 is encrypted with a timestamp to guarantee confidentiality.
VI. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In SDS2 [34] , there are some fundamental inferences for security and performance analysis,as an expanded scheme, our protocol will take an advantage of it. The theorems proved in SDS2 will be used as lemmas for verifying the Searchable features in this paper.
• It is proved that unauthorized users can't get access to VDO's privacy data, and semi-trusted CSP can't peek in the sensitive data. While, with the certification, authorized vehicle users can recover the shared data.
• We can conclude that the implementation of the S2PD scheme is secure against the collusion attack.
• By deductions in Lemma 4 and Theorem 1, we prove that data transmission cost in our protocol could be decreased by half, meanwhile, we shift computing operator to CSP, that will greatly benefit for the VDO and User. 
Lemma 4: In our scheme, the overhead of the User and VDO is 2O(|Data x |), which is almost half of DTU scheme.
Proof: It is deduced in Lemma 1 that the overhead of the VDO and User is O(|key x |) + O(|Data x |) in total, we can conclude that |key x |/|Data x | → 0. Hence, the overhead of the VDO's of S2PD (O(|key x |)) approaches 0. In the Data-ToUser(DTU) scheme, VDO downloads, decrypts and transmits its sharing data to the User, the overhead of DTU will be (2O(|Data x |)). Compared with DTU scheme, the overhead of our protocol is (O(|key x |)+O(|Data x |) = O(|Data x |)), which is reduced almost half of the scheme (2O(|Data x |)).
Theorem 1: In our protocol, with searchability, the running time and the communication cost at the User are obviously reduced compared with the SDS2 scheme [34] .
Proof: Let us consider the specific cost in the case that the authorized User wants to search C = A×B on outsourced data with access to columns A and B. In SDS2, the User needs to download the half-decrypted A and B from the CSP and calculate C = A×B by itself. However, in our S2PD, the User can send a sharing request containing the query to the CSP. The CSP computes the encrypted results C of the query with encrypted A and B. The User only needs to compute the secret key of C to decrypt the results C. Therefore, the running time at the User of our protocol is close to 0 compared to SDS2. The communication cost at the User of our protocol is half as much as the cost of SDS2.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we present a proof-of-concept implementation of our scheme based on the VSN architecture shown in Figure 2 . We run our protocol on the machine with Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-2430M CPU @ 2.40GHz and 4GB memory running Ubuntu 16.04. We use MySQL 5.7.19 as the underlying DBMS.Algorithms of encryption are written in C++ using the GMP library.
A. CASE STUDY
First of all, we propose a case to explain the process of our protocol. In the case, we set g = 2, n = 
B. EVALUATION
We compare the S2PD protocol with the implementation of four schemes: (1)Key-To-User(KTU), (2)Data-ToUser(DTU), (3)Proxy-Re-Encryption(PRE),(4)SDS2. In S2PD, the VDO deploys two encryption algorithms separately, there are SDB [30] and AES. The encryption algorithm of SDB is used to encrypt the User's data, which is key User x , while the AES algorithm is used to encrypt the CSP's message, that is key CSP x . Therefore, the user utilizes SDB to recover the half-decrypted data downloaded from CSP. We take advantage of SDB's data interoperability to achieve the reduction in data computation. For comparison, we encrypt data by AES when KTU and DTU are applied. Because in VSN scenarios, the overhead of VDO over time should be considered in the simulation. The parameters used in the experiment are shown in Table 2 . We design our simulation according to the following assumptions: 1) Table2 shows the quantity of data and request not only large but also increase rapidly. We assume that VDO outsources 3 GB data to the public cloud each month, which means the cloud's increment is 3GB, denoted by D. We divided data block S d into about 20 MB each. 2) Data Users in VSN can apply for data sharing at any time and the User's requests for data blocks are chosen randomly by default. 3) For simplicity, we choose ten vehicles as the VDO and User, then all the sharing requests should be sent from these ten vehicles. Our scheme can be easily extended to mounting users in VSN. For start, Each data block is assigned to a sharing vehicle user by default before they received the first sharing request. In the PRE scheme, if the sharing request for the same block sent by the different vehicle user, the DO would re-encrypt the data block and send the key to the CSP. 4) We recorded the execution time for all the schemes to evaluate the computing cost and analyzed the communication cost in VSN between entities.
From Figure 5 to 8 indicate the contrast of five schemes as the outsourced data size increases from 3 GB to 36 GB. However, Figure 5 and Figure 6 focus on the comparison of execution times for the VDO and User respectively.
From Figure 5 we can conclude that, with the data increasing, the computing cost at the VDO's rises steadily in all schemes. For PRE scheme, Figure 5 shows a maximum cost. The reason for that is even for the same data block, PRE needs to re-encrypt it if different vehicle users apply for data sharing.
We make a few observations from Figure 6 : (1) Compared to VDO's computing cost, User's cost is much lower. For DTU, the running time is approaching 0 because the User is responsibility is simple which is receiving shared data. But the scheme is not secure and may reveal sensitive data or the VDO's privacy to the adversary. (2) For SDS2 and S2PD, the execution times of the VDO are lower compared with KTU and PRE, Because in SDS2 and S2PD, CSP takes the responsibility to half-decrypt the sharing data, which greatly reduces the User's computing cost. (3) compared with SDS2, User's running time is much lower in S2PD, that is because the User can search on the outsourced data and it just needs to decrypt and operate the data in demand. For the case we illustrated in VII-A, the User only needs to downloads the encrypted column C instead of downloading A, B and calculating C.
We compared the communication cost of the five schemes in Figure 7 . For SDS2 and S2PD,the communication cost of the VDO is decreased by half compared with DTU, which verifies Lemma 3 coincidentally. We can conclude as follows: (1) The communication cost at the VDO's has a remarkable growth with the increase of sharing data size. (2) For DTU, the cost is much higher, cause the VDO needs to download, decrypt and transmit data for the sharing vehicle users. (3) For PRE, the VDO will assign different encryption keys for different User, thus the communication cost is higher than SDS2, S2PD, and KTU. (4) Figure 7 shows that the VDO's communication cost of SDS2 and S2PD are relatively flat, that is because according to Theorem 3, the two schemes transfer decryption keys to the User from the VDO, which is the same as KTU.
The communication cost of the five scheme for vehicle users and the cost is shown in Figure 8 . The Figure 8 indicates that User's communication cost for S2PD is lowest compared with the other four schemes. That is because in S2PD the User is responsible for receiving half-decrypted sharing data under a session key, operations such as encryption keys, certificate, re-encryption information are manipulated by CSP or VDO. Furthermore, the User can search on the shared data, the User only needs to download the results of the query and the CSP undertakes most of the computing for the User. For the case we illustrated in VII-A, the User only needs to downloads the encrypted column C instead of A and B.
In conclusion, S2PD is especially suitable for VSN, in which the vehicle users are generally accepted as possessing limited storage capacity, lower computing ability, and experience communication cost.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a selective sharing scheme for VSN and gave a comprehensive description and analysis for it. S2PD enables vehicle data owners to share its sensitive data with others, which support secure query processing on the cloud. On one hand, it builds a framework that supports a secure sharing data in the vehicular social network, on the other hand, we explore a novel performance approach for sensitive data searching which shifts-large scale computing cost to cloud service provider (CSP) . Besides, we analyze the security and performance of S2PD in theory. By experiment, we showed that S2PD is applicable to real-time queries and applications. Compared with the other five sharing scheme, we proved our scheme is practically efficient, the computing and communication overhead is lower than the others.
